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1. Introduction
While open-source and proprietary platforms have coexisted since the early days
of the computing industry, competition between these two modes of development
has intensied dramatically following the surge of the Internet in the mid-1990s.
Prominent examples include Linux vs. Windows, Open Oce vs. Microsoft Oce,
Firefox vs. Safari, Apache vs. MS Internet Server, and more recently, Google's
Android vs. Apple's iOS.
The open-source development model is characterized by two distinctive features:
open access (the freedom to use the software free of charge) and open investment
(the freedom to modify the source code).
1 Proprietary development, on the
other hand, has closed access and closed investment: the platform owner sets
access prices and invests centrally to improve its quality. The coexistence of these
two diametrically opposed modes of platform governance has sparked a thriving
literature on open source examining why individuals and prot-maximizing rms
might choose to contribute to open-source development (see Lerner and Tirole,
2005; von Krogh and von Hippel, 2006; Fershtman and Gandal, 2011, for recent
surveys).
While insightful and enlightening, theoretical developments on the economics
of open source have fallen short of fully embracing the modeling breakthroughs
oered by the literature on two-sided platforms of the past decade (e.g., Caillaud
and Jullien, 2003; Rochet and Tirole, 2003, 2006; Armstrong, 2006; Hagiu, 2006a;
Spulber, 2006; Weyl, 2010). Likewise, while the literature on two-sided platforms
has studied some aspects of open platforms, the most distinctive feature of open
source (i.e., open investment) has not been considered.
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In this paper, we bring together these two streams of work to address the fol-
lowing questions: (i) How are the incentives to invest in platform quality aected
by the degree of platform openness? (ii) What is the relation between access and
investment strategies? and (iii) How are access prices and incentives to invest in
platform quality moderated by competition between open-source and proprietary
two-sided platforms?
We set up a model of a platform that brings together users and developers
of applications. Users are heterogeneous in their willingness to pay for access
to the platform. Developers are heterogeneous in that they bear dierent costs
for developing applications. A proprietary platform chooses how much to invest
in platform quality and sets access prices for each side of the market. An open
platform may be accessed for free and developers may invest in improving its
quality.
3 After users and developers have accessed the platform, developers
compete to sell applications to users. Users prefer product variety but consider
applications as interchangeable. Along with the case of substitute applications
whose marginal value decreases with the number of applications available, we
study the mirror case of complement applications.
We divide the analysis into two parts. First, we examine models of propri-
etary and open monopoly platforms; that is, we consider incentives to invest in
proprietary and open platforms in isolation from each other and compare equilib-
rium outcomes. In the second part, we study a mixed-duopoly model with direct
competition between both types of platforms.
We obtain the following results. First, open platforms may benet from limited
developer access. The intuition is that the level of investment by developers
depends on the expected prot that these investments generate. If the eect
of a change in the number of applications on developer revenue decreases with4 CASADESUS-MASANELL AND LLANES
investment in platform quality, a lower number of developers may result in higher
investment in the open platform.
Second, if we compare a proprietary and an open platform with the same number
of users and developers, the proprietary platform always enjoys more investment.
However, an open platform may result in higher investment if it leads to a dierent
number of users or developers. Specically, the open platform may garner more
investment only if one of the following conditions is met: (i) the open platform
attracts more users, or (ii) the open platform attracts fewer developers and the
eect of a change in the number of applications on developer revenue decreases
with investment in platform quality, or (iii) the open platform attracts more de-
velopers and the eect of a change in the number of applications on developer
revenue increases with investment in platform quality.
Third, opening one side of a proprietary platform may lower incentives to invest
in platform quality. A closed platform sets access prices to internalize indirect
network eects. This allows the platform to capture the entire variation in utility
resulting from larger investment. Internalizing network eects is not possible when
one of the sides has free access. In this case, the platform captures less of the
investment's contribution to consumer utility. As a result, investment incentives
are weaker. Lower investment, in turn, may lead to lower levels of adoption by
users and developers.
Finally, in a mixed duopoly where a proprietary and an open platform compete
to attract single-homing users and where developers can multi-home, we nd two
results. First, the structure of access prices depends on: (i) how changes in the
number of developers aect the incentives to invest in the open platform, and
(ii) how investment in the open platform aects the revenues of the proprietaryINVESTMENT INCENTIVES IN TWO-SIDED PLATFORMS 5
platform. Depending on the sign of these two eects, user and developer access
prices may increase or decrease relative to a situation without investment.
We also nd that a proprietary platform may benet from higher investment
in the competitor open platform. The intuition is that the number of applica-
tions in the open platform is determined by developers' revenues, which increase
with platform quality. Under multi-homing, both platforms share applications.
A larger number of applications, in turn, may lead to higher revenues for the
proprietary platform.
This result explains why proprietary rms may choose to contribute to the
development of competing open-source platforms. For example, in a recent report,
Corbet, Kroah-Hartman, and McPherson (2012) show that Microsoft ranks 17 in
the list of top contributors to Linux. Indeed, while in 2001 Microsoft's CEO
Steve Ballmer famously claimed that \Linux is a cancer that attaches itself in an
intellectual property sense to everything it touches," in 2010 Jean Paoli (general
manager of Microsoft's interoperability strategy team) declared: \We love open
source."
Our analysis has important managerial implications. First, we show under
what conditions open source may lead to high investment in platform quality,
which has important implications for prot-maximizing and non-prot rms par-
ticipating on operating-system or applications markets. Second, we show that
access and investment policies have dierent eects on the equilibrium, but also
have important interactions. For example, introducing an open-access policy in
an otherwise proprietary platform may improve access incentives, but at the cost
of lowering investment incentives. Third, we show how access prices should be
set when a proprietary platform competes directly with an open-source platform.6 CASADESUS-MASANELL AND LLANES
Finally, we show that open platforms may be complementary to proprietary plat-
forms, especially when the proprietary platform needs to build an installed base
of applications.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the following section, we
explain how our paper relates with the extant literature. In Section 2, we present
the model. In Section 3, we study and compare monopoly proprietary and open
platforms. In Section 4, we study a hybrid model with open access and closed
investment. In Section 5, we study a mixed duopoly model in which a proprietary
platform and an open platform compete for users. Section 6 concludes. All proofs
are in the appendix.
1.1. Related literature. Our paper contributes to the literature on multisided
markets and on the economics of open source. A large share of the extant litera-
ture on two-sided platforms studies pricing in the presence of network eects (e.g.,
Spulber, 1996; Caillaud and Jullien, 2003; Rochet and Tirole, 2003, 2006; Arm-
strong, 2006; Hagiu, 2006a; Nocke, Peitz, and Stahl, 2007; Casadesus-Masanell
and Ruiz-Aliseda, 2008; Weyl, 2010). In general terms, the structure of equilib-
rium prices depends on the relative size of demand elasticities and cross-group
externalities, the costs of serving each side of the market, market structure, and
whether end-users single-home or multi-home. Although we focus on the incen-
tives to invest in platform quality, we also derive the access prices charged by
proprietary platforms in equilibrium and obtain results congruous with the lit-
erature. Closer to our setting, Hagiu (2006b) and Economides and Katsamakas
(2006b) compare proprietary and open platforms. These papers model open plat-
forms as open-access platforms. While we also assume zero access prices for open
platforms, we allow for developer innovation to improve platform quality.INVESTMENT INCENTIVES IN TWO-SIDED PLATFORMS 7
Incentives to invest in platform quality in proprietary and open-source two-sided
platforms have not been analyzed before. Hagiu (2007), Belleamme and Peitz
(2010), Zhao (2010), and Lin, Li, and Whinston (2011) study sellers' incentives
to invest in the quality of the products they sell, rather than on the quality of the
platform. Our work is closer to Economides and Katsamakas (2006a) who examine
incentives to invest in a one-sided platform with one application developer. These
authors compare proprietary and open-source operating systems. In a proprietary
operating system, quality-enhancing investments are made by the platform owner;
in an open-source operating system, investments are made by the application
developer and advanced users. They nd that the incentives to invest in the
application are generally larger when the platform is open, and that investment
in the open-source operating system is larger if there are strong reputation eects
from participation in open-source development or a signicant part of the users
are developers.
Rather than one-sided operating systems, we consider two-sided platforms. In
our setting, the proprietary platform chooses access prices for two sides and may
subsidize one side in order to better exploit indirect network eects. Moreover,
we allow for endogenous platform adoption by users and developers and, contrary
to Economides and Katsamakas (2006a), in our model there is always a large
number of users and developers. We do not consider the role of reputation from
participation in open-source development on developers' incentives to invest. Our
analysis thus shows that an open platform may obtain higher investment than a
proprietary one even in the absence of reputational concerns.
The early literature on open source was concerned with explaining why indi-
vidual developers contributed to open-source projects allegedly for free (Lerner
and Tirole, 2005; von Krogh and von Hippel, 2006; Fershtman and Gandal, 2011,8 CASADESUS-MASANELL AND LLANES
present excellent surveys). The most common explanations were altruism, per-
sonal gratication, peer recognition, and career concerns. We do not consider
social preferences or career concerns. Rather, we focus on self-interested agents
and examine the value of investments in the platform to the very developers who
make those investments.
Our paper also contributes to an emerging literature in strategy that explores
competitive interactions between organizations with dierent business models.
While several formal models of asymmetric competition exist in strategy (mainly,
dierences in costs, resource endowments, or information), the asymmetries that
this literature wrestles with are of a dierent nature: rms with fundamentally
dierent objective functions, opposed approaches to competing, or dierent gov-
ernance structures. Within this literature, papers examining competition be-
tween open-source and proprietary software have considered duopoly models of
a prot-maximizing, proprietary rm and a community of not-for-prot/non-
strategic open-source developers selling at zero price (Mustonen, 2003; Bitzer,
2004; Gaudeul, 2005; Casadesus-Masanell and Ghemawat, 2006; Economides and
Katsamakas, 2006b; Lee and Mendelson, 2008; Casadesus-Masanell and Llanes,
2011). These papers, however, assume that investment incentives are exogenously
given (generally, investment in open source is a function of the number of users).
The exception is Llanes and de Elejalde (2013), who assume that investment is
performed by sellers of complementary goods. In addition, for the most part, the
literature on mixed duopoly presents models of one-sided rms. We contribute
work in this area by endogenizing developer's investment incentives and by con-
sidering interactions between dierent types of two-sided platforms.INVESTMENT INCENTIVES IN TWO-SIDED PLATFORMS 9
2. The model
We study a two-sided monopoly platform that brings together application de-
velopers and users.
4 The platform may be software (e.g., an operating system),
hardware (e.g., a DVD player), or a combination of the two (e.g., a video game
console). We focus on the incentives to invest in platform quality, that is, on the
incentives to develop the software or hardware that constitutes the platform. Al-
though the number of applications is endogenous in our model, we do not study
incentives to invest in application quality, which have been studied elsewhere
(Hagiu, 2007; Belleamme and Peitz, 2010; Zhao, 2010; Lin, Li, and Whinston,
2011).
There is a continuum of potential users, i 2 [0;1), and developers, j 2 [0;1).5
Users demand applications and run them on the platform. The indirect utility of
user i is
(1) u(i) = v(n;x)  
Z n
0
(j)dj   h(i)   p
u;
where n is the measure of available applications, x is the investment in platform
quality, v(n;x) is the gross utility of consuming n applications when the platform
has received investment x, h(i) is a user-specic adoption cost, pu is the platform
access price for users, and (j) is the price of application j.6
We follow the usual convention of representing partial derivatives through sub-
scripts (e.g., vnx =
@2 v(n;x)
@n@x ), and assume that all functions are three times contin-
uously dierentiable.
Users prefer higher quality platforms and application variety, vx > 0 and vn > 0.
The investment in platform quality and the measure of applications are comple-
ments, vnx  0. If vnn = 0, applications are independent in that consuming10 CASADESUS-MASANELL AND LLANES
more of any one application does not aect the marginal utility of consuming
any other application. The cases vnn < 0 and vnn > 0 correspond to appli-
cations being substitutes and complements, respectively. If vnn < 0, we have
v(n1;x) + v(n2;x) > v(n1 + n2;x), and applications detract from each other.
The reverse is true for complements. Without loss of generality, let h(0) = 0.
Consumers are ordered according to cost so that hi > 0. Therefore, h(i)  0.
Each developer may produce one application. Developer j's prots are
(2) (j) = (j)m   c(j)   p
d    x(j);
where m is the measure of users, c(j) is a developer-specic development cost,  is
the marginal cost of investing in platform quality, x(j) is developer j's investment
in platform quality, and pd is the platform access price for developers. Developers
are ordered according to cost so that cj > 0. Assume 0  c(0)  vn(0;x), which
means that having a positive number of applications is always desirable from a
social point of view.
There are two types of platforms. In a proprietary platform, the platform is
provided by a prot-maximizing rm, which sets access prices pu and pd and
invests in platform quality. Therefore, in this case, developers' investment x(j)
is null. In an open-source platform (hereinafter referred to as \open platform"),
access to the platform is free, pu = 0 and pd = 0, and developers invest in platform
quality. Therefore, x(j) may be positive.
As noted in the introduction, the extant literature on open platforms in multi-
sided markets has only considered the zero-price dimension of open source (open
access), and has not studied the implications of open source on the incentives for
innovation (open investment). We include this important aspect of open platforms
in our model and analysis.INVESTMENT INCENTIVES IN TWO-SIDED PLATFORMS 11
3. Monopoly platforms
In this section, we study access and investment incentives in proprietary and
open platforms in isolation from each other and compare equilibrium outcomes.
We begin by characterizing the socially optimal allocation.
3.1. First best. The social planner chooses m, n, and x to maximize the sum of
indirect utility and prots:
W =
Z m
0
u(i)di +
Z n
0
(j)dj;
= mv(n;x)  
Z m
0
h(i)di  
Z n
0
c(j)dj    x:
For easiness of exposition, in what follows we omit functional arguments when
writing equilibrium conditions. Thus, functions v(n;x) and their derivatives are
evaluated at the equilibrium values of m, n, and x. Likewise, functions h(i) and
c(j) and their derivatives are evaluated at the marginal user i=m and developer
j=n.
The equations characterizing the rst best (obtained straightforwardly by dif-
ferentiating W with respect to m, n, and x) are
v = h; mvn = c; and mvx = :
3.2. Proprietary platform. The timing of the game is the following: (i) the
platform provider chooses x, pu, and pd; (ii) users and developers decide whether
to join the platform; and (iii) developers choose (j), and users choose how many
applications to buy. The equilibrium concept is subgame perfect equilibrium.12 CASADESUS-MASANELL AND LLANES
Since developers cannot invest in platform quality, equations (1) and (2) become
u(i) = v(n;x)  
Z n
0
(j)dj   h(i)   p
u;
(j) = (j)m   c(j)   p
d:
In the third stage, developers choose the price of applications. Let (j) be
the third-stage equilibrium price of application j. Price is determined dierently
when applications are substitutes and complements.
When applications are substitutes, the largest price an application developer
may charge is vn (if the price of any application was greater than the marginal
value of the last application, users would be better o not consuming that appli-
cation), which means that application prices are (j) = vn for all j.
When applications are complements, the equilibrium price is no longer vn. To
see this, note that if price was vn, the total cost of a bundle of n applications
would be larger than its gross utility to users (nvn > v(n;x)   v(0;x)), and thus
users would be better o not buying any application. In equilibrium, we must
have
R n
0 (j)dj  v(n;x)   v(0;x). As long as
R n
0 (j)dj < v(n;x)   v(0;x), a
developer may increase the price of its application without aecting user demand.
Thus, in equilibrium
R n
0 (j)dj = v(n;x)   v(0;x). Let w(n;x) =
v(n;x) v(0;x)
n be
the average contribution of applications to consumer utility, and note that w(n;x)
is increasing in n and x. In a symmetric equilibrium, all developers charge the
same price, and application prices are (j) = w for all j.
In the second stage, users and developers choose whether to access the platform.
The marginal entrants, m and n, satisfy v(n;x)   n = h(m) + pu, and m =INVESTMENT INCENTIVES IN TWO-SIDED PLATFORMS 13
c(n) + pd. From here, we obtain the inverse demand functions:
p
u = v(n;x)   n
   h(m); (3)
p
d = m
   c(n): (4)
Since  does not depend on m, @ pu=@ m =  hm < 0 for substitutes and
complements. With substitutes, @ pd=@ n = mvnn   cn, which is always negative.
With complements, @ pd=@ n = mwn cn, which is negative only if ncn > m(vn 
w). We assume this condition holds.
In the rst stage, the platform provider chooses x, pu, and pd to maximize
prots mpu +npd   x. The following proposition characterizes the equilibrium.
Proposition 1 (Proprietary platform). An equilibrium exists and is unique. The
measure of users and developers and the investment in platform quality (m;n;x)
satisfy v = h+mhm, mvn = c+ncn, and mvx = . If applications are substitutes,
 = vn, pu = mhm   nvn, and pd = ncn. If applications are complements,
 = w, pu = mhm   nw, and pd = ncn   m(vn   w).
The marginal user and developer obtain zero utility and prot in equilibrium.
Therefore, the net utility of user i < m in equilibrium is u(i) = h(m)   h(i), and
the prot of developer j < n is (j) = c(n)   c(j).
The condition determining x in the proprietary platform is the same as that
of the rst best. Therefore, if m and n were set at their socially optimal levels,
investment would be optimal. A proprietary platform sets access prices in order
to capture the full increase in user surplus due to an increase in x, and thus has
strong incentives to invest in product quality.
However, the conditions determining m and n are dierent from those of the
rst best, which means that x will be set at an inecient level. Eciency requires14 CASADESUS-MASANELL AND LLANES
that the value of the platform is equal to the entry cost of the marginal user
(v = h), and that the marginal benet of the marginal application is equal to the
entry cost of the marginal developer, (mvn = c). The platform provider does not
fully internalize the marginal benets of increases in m and n, and thus sets prices
that lead to insucient entry.
Turning to the analysis of prices, we see that the platform provider may choose
to subsidize users when the price of applications is high, but that she will never
subsidize developers (recall that ncn > m(vn  w) when applications are comple-
ments).
3.3. Open platform. We now turn to the analysis of the open platform. By their
very nature, open platforms have unstructured entry and investment. Therefore,
m, n, and x(j) are determined simultaneously in the rst stage. Application
prices, (j), are set in a second stage. Since access to the platform is free, equations
(1) and (2) become:
u(i) = v(n;x)  
Z n
0
(j)dj   h(i);
(j) = (j)m   c(j)    x(j);
where x =
R n
0 x(j)dj.
In open platforms, payments between users and developers aect the incentives
to join the platform and to invest in platform quality. Because application prices
are determined dierently when they are substitutes and complements, we study
both cases separately. Proposition 2 summarizes the equilibrium choices of users
and developers when applications are substitutes.
Proposition 2 (Open platform with substitute applications). An equilibrium
exists. The measure of users and developers and the investment in platform qualityINVESTMENT INCENTIVES IN TWO-SIDED PLATFORMS 15
(m;n;x) satisfy h = v   nvn, c = mvn, and mvnx = . Application prices are
 = vn.
In the case of open platforms, there may exist multiple equilibria. We will focus
our analysis on the equilibrium with higher platform investment.
In equilibrium, users obtain u(i) = h(m)   h(i), and developers earn (j) =
c(n) c(j)  x(j). Because hi > 0 and cj > 0, larger equilibrium entry by users
or developers implies more user utility and developer prot.
A given level of equilibrium aggregate investment, x, may result from dierent
distributions of individual developer investments, x(j). As long as mvnx > , any
developer will nd it optimal to increase its investment in platform quality. In
equilibrium, mvnx =  regardless of who is investing.7 Note that since investment
is open, developers may choose not to invest in platform quality. If mvn > c(j),
developer j will nd it optimal to enter the platform. Thus, there will be entry
until mvn = c, and the marginal developer will not invest in platform quality.
The condition determining developer access is the same as that of the rst
best. However, the equilibrium is inecient for two reasons. First, user access
is suboptimal because applications are priced above their marginal cost. The
total mark-up paid by users is nvn. Second, developer incentives to invest are
not socially optimal because developers do not fully internalize the eect of an
increase in x on user utility.
We turn now to the case of complement applications. Proposition 3 summarizes
the equilibrium choices of users and developers.
Proposition 3 (Open platform with complement applications). An equilibrium
exists. The measure of users and developers and the investment in platform quality16 CASADESUS-MASANELL AND LLANES
(m;n;x) satisfy h = v   nw, c = mw, and mwx = . Application prices are
 = w.
There are two important dierences between the substitutes and complements
cases. First, when applications are complements, developers extract all the sur-
plus from users, and user utility ends up being v(0;x). However, users may still
benet indirectly from having more developers, because it may lead to higher
investment in the platform. Second, in the complements case, developer entry
would be inecient even if m and x were set at their optimal levels. The reason
is that developer revenue depends on the average contribution of the application
to consumer utility, instead of its marginal contribution, which is required for
eciency.
3.4. Comparison. In this section, we compare the equilibrium conditions for
the monopoly proprietary and open platforms. First, we compare entry and in-
vestment incentives examining one condition at a time, holding everything else
constant. Then, we present conditions under which an open platform may lead to
higher investment than a proprietary platform.8 Figure 1 presents a summary of
our results.
We begin by comparing the incentives for user access. In a proprietary platform,
the platform provider internalizes the eect of monetary payments from users to
developers, and chooses access prices to neutralize it. Thus, user access depends
only on the extensive margin of demand. In an open platform, users do not have
to pay an access price but they have to pay application prices, which depend on
the marginal or average contribution of an additional application to user utility.
Thus, user access depends only on the intensive margin of demand.INVESTMENT INCENTIVES IN TWO-SIDED PLATFORMS 17
Substitutes Complements
Welfare optimum
h + mhm h + mhm
v = h
mvn = c
mvx = 
h + mhm h + mhm
Proprietary platform
h + mhm h + mhm
v = h + mhm
mvn = c + ncn
mvx = 
h + mhm h + mhm
Open platform
v   nvn = h
mvn = c
mvnx = 
v   nw = h
mw = c
mwx = 
Figure 1. Equilibrium conditions for monopoly platforms.
Functions v(n;x) and w(n;x) and their derivatives are evaluated
at the equilibrium values of m, n, and x. Functions h(i) and c(j)
and their derivatives are evaluated at the marginal user i=m and
developer j=n.
Therefore, the comparison of user access in proprietary and open platforms
depends on how restrictive the extensive and intensive margins are; i.e., on the
comparison between mhm and nvn in the substitutes case, and between mhm
and nw in the complements case.
Recall that the equilibrium access price for users is pu = mhm   nvn for sub-
stitutes and pu = mhm   nw for complements. If intensive margin has a large
impact on the demand for platform access, the proprietary platform may end up
subsidizing users, in which case it will provide better incentives for user adoption.
The comparison of the incentives for developer access yields a dierent result:
open platforms always provide stronger incentives for developer access for a given
number of users and investment level. Open platforms provide good incentives18 CASADESUS-MASANELL AND LLANES
for developer entry. Proprietary platforms restrict developer access because they
always set a positive access price for developers.
Finally, we compare equilibrium investment. The condition that determines
quality investment in open platforms is mvnx =  (substitutes) or mwx = 
(complements). For proprietary platforms, the condition is mvx = . Holding
everything else constant (i.e., taking m and n as given), equilibrium investment
in an open platform is lower than in a proprietary platform. In the case of com-
plements, this follows from wx < vx, which always holds. In the case of sub-
stitutes, even though vnx could be larger than vx from a mathematical point of
view, it is only reasonable to assume that vnx < vx. To understand why, note
that if the model had a discrete number of developers, vnx would be dened as
vx(n;x)   vx(n   1;x), which is always smaller than vx(n;x).
In any case, investment may be larger in an open platform compared to a
proprietary one, since m, n, and x are determined jointly. In particular, an
open platform may lead to a larger number of users, which improves investment
incentives. Also, an open platform may have higher investment if it leads to
fewer developers. The reason is that when vnnx < 0, a decrease in the number
of developers lowers competitive pressure and increases their incentives to invest
in platform quality. Likewise an open platform may have higher investment if it
leads to more developers and vnnx > 0. Proposition 4 summarizes these ndings.
In Section 3.5, we illustrate this result with the help of an example.
Proposition 4. A monopoly open platform may lead to higher investment than
a monopoly proprietary platform only if one of the following conditions is met:
(i) The open platform leads to more users,INVESTMENT INCENTIVES IN TWO-SIDED PLATFORMS 19
(ii) The open platform leads to more developers when investment and appli-
cations are complements with respect to developer revenues (vnnx > 0),
or
(iii) The open platform leads to fewer developers when investment and applica-
tions are substitutes with respect to developer revenues (vnnx < 0).
3.5. Constant elasticity example. The following example illustrates that in-
vestment in platform quality may be larger when a platform is open. Let v(x;n) =
xa nb, where 0 < a < 1 and 0 < b < 1 are the elasticities of gross value with respect
to investment and the number of applications. The assumption b < 1 implies that
applications are substitutes. We also assume that 2a + b < 1, which guarantees
that the second-order conditions for prot maximization are satised. Investment
in platform quality and the measure of applications are complements, vnx > 0.
Finally, let h(i) = i, c(j) = j, and  = 1.
Using the equations in Figure 1, we derive equilibrium adoption and investment.
The social planner's solution is
m
s =

a
a b
  b
2
 1
1 2 a b
; n
s =

a
a b
2 a 1
2
 1
1 2 a b
; x
s =
 
a
1 b b
b 1
1 2 a b :
For the proprietary platform, the equations are
m
p = 2
  1 a
1 2 a b m
s; n
p = 2
  1 a
1 2 a b n
s; x
p = 2
  1 a
1 2 a b x
s:
Finally, for the open platform, we have
m
o =

a
a b
a+b
2 (1   b)
a+b 2
2
 1
1 a b
; n
o =

a
a (b(1   b))
1
2
 1
1 a b
;
x
o =

a
1 b (b(1   b))
1
2
 1
1 a b
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Due to the non-linearity of the equilibrium equations, it is not possible to nd
an explicit solution for the parameter values that lead to xo > xp. Figure 2
compares the rst best investment level (x), the investment in the open platform
(xo), and the investment in the proprietary platform (xp) for dierent values of
b and a = 0:03. As can be seen, the rst best investment is higher than the
investment in the open platform and the proprietary platform. The proprietary
platform leads to higher investment when b is small, and the open platform leads
to higher investment when b is large.
Figure 2. Comparison of equilibrium investments
4. Open access with closed investment
In this section, we study a hybrid model of a proprietary platform that grants
open access to developers, but still sets a positive access price to users and invests
in platform quality (one-sided open-access platform). The model is the same as
the one of Section 3.2, but assuming that pd = 0. The platform provider may
be constrained to oer free access to one side because of regulations or habits,
or it may be too costly to observe access for one side. Proposition 5 shows the
equilibrium of this game.INVESTMENT INCENTIVES IN TWO-SIDED PLATFORMS 21
Proposition 5 (Open access with closed investment). When applications are
substitutes, the measure of users and developers and the investment in platform
quality (m;n;x) satisfy v = h + mhm + ncn
cn mvnn vn, mvn = c, and mvx  
ncn
cn mvnn mvnx = . Equilibrium prices are  = vn and pu = mhm+ nvn
cn mvnn mvnn.
When applications are complements, the measure of users and developers and the
investment in platform quality (m;n;x) satisfy v = h + mhm +
ncn m(vn w)
cn mwn w,
mw = c, and m(vx   nwx) = . Equilibrium prices are  = w and pu = mhm.
A comparison of Propositions 1 and 5 shows that access and investment strate-
gies have dierent eects on the equilibrium, but also have important interactions.
In a proprietary platform with closed access, investment incentives are strong
because the platform provider can internalize indirect network eects between
the two groups, and adjust access prices accordingly. Thus, the platform provider
appropriates the contribution of investment to users' gross utility, vx, which means
that investment would be socially optimal if m and n were set at their rst-best
levels. With open access, the platform provider cannot internalize network eects,
and thereby benets only partially from her investment in platform quality. Thus,
investment incentives would be suboptimal even if m and n were set at their rst-
best levels.
As for access incentives, giving open access to developers improves their direct
incentives to join the platform, but has a direct negative eect on user access and
investment. Given that developers' revenues depend on user demand, which in
turn depends on the investment in the platform, a one-sided open-access policy
may reduce the number of developers in equilibrium.22 CASADESUS-MASANELL AND LLANES
5. Mixed Duopoly
In this section, we extend the model to analyze competition between a propri-
etary platform and an open platform. For concreteness, we will focus on the case
of substitute applications, but similar results hold for the case of complements.
We model the mixed duopoly as follows. There is one unit mass of single-
homing users, indexed by i 2 [0;1]. User i's utility of consuming n applications
in the proprietary and open platforms are
u
p(i) = v(n
p;x
p)  
Z np
0

p(j)dj   p
u   h
p(i);
u
o(i) = v(n
o;x
o)  
Z no
0

o(j)dj   h
o(i);
where superscripts p and o indicate whether the variable or function refers to the
proprietary platform or to the open platform.
Access to the open platform is free. To guarantee that the market is covered, we
assume that mini hp(i) and mini ho(i) are suciently low. The optimal choice of
platform by users depends on h(i) = hp(i) ho(i), which measures the dierence in
the cost of learning how to use the proprietary vs. the open platform. Assume hi >
0, with limi!0 h(i) =  1 and limi!1 h(i) = 1. Let m indicate the indierent
user. Then, m is the measure of users choosing the proprietary platform, and
1   m is the measure of users choosing the open platform.
Developers multi-home. Thus we assume that it is inexpensive to adapt ap-
plications to run on both platforms. Even though the measure of applications
is the same for both platforms, equilibrium application prices may dier across
platforms because they depend on platform quality investments.INVESTMENT INCENTIVES IN TWO-SIDED PLATFORMS 23
The timing is as follows: (i) the proprietary platform chooses pu, pd, and xp;
(ii) users choose which platform to join, and developers decide whether to de-
velop an application and choose xo(j); and (iii) users and developers bargain over
application prices p(j) and o(j). The timing reects the fact that proprietary
platforms are developed before they become accessible to users and developers,
but that adoption and development are contemporaneous in open platforms. The
equilibrium concept is subgame perfection.
In the third stage, users and developers bargain over application prices. The
price of applications running on the proprietary platform is vp
n, and the price of
applications running on the open platform is vo
n.
In the second stage, the marginal user and developer satisfy h(m) = vp   vo  
n(vp
n   vo
n)   pu and c(n) = mvp
n + (1   m)vo
n   pd. The inverse demands are
p
u = v
p   v
o   n(v
p
n   v
o
n)   h; (5)
p
d = mv
p
n + (1   m)v
o
n   c; (6)
and the optimal investment in the open platform by developers is
(7) (1   m)v
o
nx = :
In the rst stage, the platform provider chooses pu, pd, and xp to maximize
prots, taking into account that the second-stage equilibrium levels of m, n, and
xo are functions of pu, pd, and xp. Proposition 6 characterizes the equilibrium.
Proposition 6 (Mixed duopoly). An equilibrium exists and is unique. The mea-
sure of users and developers and investments in platform quality (m, n, xo, xp)24 CASADESUS-MASANELL AND LLANES
satisfy
h + mhm = (v
p   v
o) + (nv
o
nx   mv
o
x)
vo
nx
(1   m)vo
nxx
;
c + ncn = m(v
p
n   v
o
n) + (v
o
n + nv
o
nn)   (nv
o
nx   mv
o
x)

 
vo
nnx
vo
nxx

;
(1   m)vo
nx = , and mvp
x = . Equilibrium access prices are
p
u = mhm   n(v
p
n   v
o
n)   (nv
o
nx   mv
o
x)
vo
nx
(1   m)vo
nxx
;
p
d = n(cn   v
o
nn)   (nv
o
nx   mv
o
x)

 
vo
nnx
vo
nxx

:
Proposition 6 shows that access prices are aected by investment incentives in
the open platform. The proprietary-platform provider takes into account that her
decisions aect the incentives to invest in the open platform, which in turn, aect
platform membership decisions, and adjusts access prices accordingly.
To understand this result, consider the equilibrium prices pu and pd, and assume
that xo is xed (vo
nx = 0). In this case, the price equations are
p
u = mhm   n(v
p
n   v
o
n);
p
d = n(cn   v
o
nn):
Allowing for changes in xo, we have
p
u = mhm   n(v
p
n   v
o
n)   (nv
o
nx   mv
o
x)
vo
nx
(1   m)vo
nxx
;
p
d = n(cn   v
o
nn)   (nv
o
nx   mv
o
x)

 
vo
nnx
vo
nxx

:
The new terms in the price equations measure the indirect eect of changes in m
and n on prots as they operate through xo. To see this, note that the e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change in xo on the revenues of the proprietary rm is
m
@pu
@xo + n
@pd
@xo = m ( v
o
x + nv
o
nx) + n(1   m)v
o
nx
nv
o
nx   mv
o
x;
and the eects of changes in m and n on xo are
@xo
@m
=
vo
nx
(1   m)vo
nxx
;
@xo
@n
=  
vo
nnx
vo
nxx
:
Thus, the eect of the open platform's investment in the structure of access prices
depends on: (i) how an increase in m and n aect the incentives to invest in the
open platform, and (ii) how an increase in the investment in the open platform
aects the revenues of the proprietary platform.
An increase in the investment in the open platform has two opposing eects on
the revenues of the proprietary platform. On one hand, an increase in xo raises
the gross value of the open platform, thereby lowering user-side revenues for the
proprietary platform. On the other hand, an increase in xo raises application
prices and developer revenues, leading to higher developer-side revenues.
Therefore, an increase in the quality of the open platform may lead to higher
revenues for the proprietary platform. This seemingly counter-intuitive result
is due to multi-homing. The proprietary-platform provider gains more on the
developer side when there is more developer access, and access is partly determined
by developers' revenues in the open platform.
Turning to the analysis of the eects of changes in m and n on xo, an increase
in m decreases the market share of the open platform, and therefore lowers the
incentives to invest in it. On the other hand, an increase in n may lead to higher26 CASADESUS-MASANELL AND LLANES
or lower investment in the open platform, depending on the sign of vo
nnx, which
is positive (negative) when n and x are complements (substitutes) with respect
to application price o = vo
n. If vo
nnx > 0, an increase in n leads to a higher vo
nx,
and thus leads to more incentives to invest. Likewise, if vo
nnx < 0, an increase in
n lowers incentives to invest.
Depending on the sign of these eects, pu and pd may increase or decrease
relative to a situation without investment. For example, if an increase in xo
lowers the revenues of the proprietary platform, and an increase in n leads to
higher investment in the open platform, the proprietary platform should lower pu
and raise pd, in comparison to the model without investment. Figure 3 summarizes
the strategic implications of investment incentives on access prices.
Positive!
Lower user access prices!
Raise developer access prices!
Negative! Positive!
Effect of developer 
access on open-
platform investment!
Effect of open-platform investment on 
proprietary-platform revenues!
Negative!
Lower user access prices!
Lower developer access prices!
Raise user access prices!
Raise developer access prices!
Raise user access prices!
Lower developer access prices!
Figure 3. Eect of investment incentives on access prices in the
duopoly
Finally, from the equations determining platform investments, we obtain the
following ratio in equilibrium:
1   m
m
=
vp
n
vo
nx
:INVESTMENT INCENTIVES IN TWO-SIDED PLATFORMS 27
Therefore, equilibrium investment in the proprietary platform increases relative
to the investment in the open platform as the equilibrium market share of the
proprietary platform increases.
In summary, we nd that the eect of investment in the open platform on the
structure of access prices depends on: (i) how changes in the number of developers
aect investments in the open platform, and (ii) how investments in the open
platform aect the revenues of the proprietary platform.
We also show that when developers multi-home, the proprietary platform may
benet from higher quality investment in the open platform, which explains why
proprietary rms may choose to contribute to the development of competing open-
source platforms.
6. Conclusion
We have examined models of open-source and proprietary two-sided platforms
to study equilibrium investment in quality. Our analysis has provided answers
to three important questions that had not been tackled before in the literature:
(i) How are the incentives to invest in platform quality aected by the degree
of platform openness? (ii) What is the relation between access and investment
strategies? and (iii) How are access prices and incentives to invest in platform
quality moderated by competition between proprietary and open two-sided plat-
forms?
Regarding the rst question, we nd that investment incentives are stronger in
a proprietary platform for a given level of user and developer access, but that an
open platform may still lead to higher investment if one of the following condi-
tions is met: (i) the open platform attracts more users, or (ii) the open platform
attracts fewer developers and the eect of a change in the number of applications28 CASADESUS-MASANELL AND LLANES
on developer revenue decreases with investment in platform quality, or (iii) the
open platform attracts more developers and the eect of a change in the number
of applications on developer revenue increases with investment in platform qual-
ity. Therefore, we nd that the successful development of an open platform may
require limited developer access.
For the second question, we nd that investment incentives depend on the
access policies in place. For example, opening one side of a proprietary platform
may lead to fewer users and developers and to lower investment, compared to a
proprietary platform with closed access on both sides. If the proprietary platform
cannot price both sides, it cannot internalize indirect network eects and thus,
has weaker investment incentives. Lower investment, in turn, may lead to less
adoption by users and developers.
Finally, for the question of incentives to invest and competition, we nd that
investment incentives in the open platform aect access prices and investment in-
centives in the proprietary platform. In particular, the structure of access prices of
the proprietary platform depends on: (i) how changes in the number of developers
aect the incentives to invest in the open platform, and (ii) how investment in
the open platform aects the revenues of the proprietary platform. Also, we nd
that a proprietary platform may benet from higher investment in the open plat-
form. The reason is that when developers multi-home, the proprietary-platform
provider gains more when more applications are developed, and the number of
applications is partly determined by developers' revenues in the open platform.
We hope to have provided a solid rst step to better understand incentives to
invest in proprietary and open platforms. Our analysis has important managerial
implications. First, we show under which conditions open source may lead toINVESTMENT INCENTIVES IN TWO-SIDED PLATFORMS 29
high investment in platform quality, which has important implications for prot-
maximizing and non-prot rms participating on operating-system or applications
markets. Second, we show that access and investment policies have dierent eects
on the equilibrium, but also have important interactions. For example, introduc-
ing an open-access policy in an otherwise proprietary platform may improve access
incentives at the cost of lowering investment incentives. Third, we show how ac-
cess prices should be set when a proprietary platform competes directly with an
open-source platform. Finally, we show that open platforms may be complemen-
tary to proprietary platforms, especially when the proprietary platform needs to
construct an installed base of applications.
In order to focus our analysis on the incentives for platform investment, we have
made several simplifying assumptions, such as not considering direct network ef-
fects among users, restricting heterogeneity to adoption costs for users and devel-
opment costs for developers, and abstracting from design conicts in open-source
development. Extending the model to allow for direct network eects, heterogene-
ity in user valuations, and code forking present interesting directions for further
research.
Appendix: Proofs of propositions in text
Proof of Proposition 1. There is a unique pair of prices pu, pd for each pair
m;n, so nding the optimal m and n is equivalent to nding the optimal pu and
pd. Replacing prices by inverse demand functions in the prot function we obtain
m(v   n   h(m)) + n(m   c(n))    x. Rearranging terms, prots can be
rewritten as mv   mh(m)   nc(n)    x.
The rst-order conditions with respect to (m;n;x) are v = h + mhm, mvn =
c + ncn and mvx = . Assuming hmm and cnn are positive, or negative but not30 CASADESUS-MASANELL AND LLANES
too large in absolute value, the second-order conditions will hold, and there will
be at least one local maximum. If there is more than one local maximum, the
rm will choose the one with the largest prot (i.e., the global maximum).
Substituting the rst two expressions in the inverse demand functions, we obtain
the optimal access prices. There is a unique pair (pu;pd) for a given triple (m;n;x).
Finally, even though in the second stage users and developers may coordinate
in dierent second-stage equilibria for a given pair of access prices (i.e., there may
be more than one pair m;n solving v = h + mhm and mvn = c + ncn), only one
combination m;n will be part of the Nash equilibrium of the complete game (the
one corresponding to the optimal prices pu, pd), which is a condition for subgame
perfect equilibrium. Thus, the equilibrium is unique.
Proof of Proposition 2. By the arguments brought forward in Section 3.2, ap-
plication price is vn. In the rst stage, users and developers choose whether to
enter the platform, and developers choose how much to invest in platform quality.
In choosing how much to invest, developers solve
max
x(j)
mvn(n;x)   c(j)    x(j):
The rst-order conditions yield mvnx = . The marginal user and developer
obtain zero utility and prot. The marginal agents do not invest in platform
innovation. Therefore, in equilibrium we must have v   nvn   h(m) = 0, and
mvn   c(n) = 0.
Proof of Proposition 3. The proof follows similar steps as the proof of Propo-
sition 2, taking into account that the price of applications is now w.
Proof of Proposition 4. In a monopoly proprietary platform, equilibrium in-
vestment solves mvx = . In a monopoly open platform, investment solvesINVESTMENT INCENTIVES IN TWO-SIDED PLATFORMS 31
mvnx = . As we explained above, for given n;x, it makes sense to assume
that vx > vnx. Thus, if m and n are the same in both platforms, investment in
the proprietary platform will be higher. Suppose now that vnnx < 0 (the proof for
vnnx > 0 is analogous) and that in equilibrium n is larger for the open platform.
Then, it is clear that investment can be larger in the open platform only if it
leads to a higher m. Suppose now that m is smaller in the open platform. Then,
vnx > vx and investment is larger in the open platform only if it leads to fewer
developers.
Proof of Proposition 5. When applications are substitutes, the measure of
users and developers is determined by x and pu through the equations pu =
v   nvn   h, and 0 = mvn   c. Using the implicit function theorem, we obtain
the following derivatives:
@m
@pu =
mvnn   cn
cn hm + (nvn   mhm)vnn
;
@n
@pu =
 vn
cn hm + (nvn   mhm)vnn
;
@m
@x
=
cn (vx   nvnx)   mvnn vx
cn hm + (nvn   mhm)vnn
;
@n
@x
=
mvnx hm + (vx   nvnx)vn
cn hm + (nvn   mhm)vnn
:
The platform provider chooses pu and x in order to maximize pu m(pu;x)  
 x. Introducing the derivatives obtained above in the rst-order conditions, we
obtain the results stated in the proposition. The proof for the complementary
applications case is analogous.
Proof of Proposition 6. Existence and uniqueness follow from similar argu-
ments than those of Proposition 1. The rst-order conditions are m + pu dm
dpu +
pd dn
dpu = 0, pu dm
dpd + n + pd dn
dpd = 0 and pu dm
dxp + pd dn
dxp    = 0. The optimal
choices depend on the derivatives of m(pu;pd;xp) and n(pu;pd;xp) with respect to32 CASADESUS-MASANELL AND LLANES
pu, pd, and xp. We will show how to obtain dm
dpu (the other derivatives are obtained
similarly). The total dierentials of equations (5), (6) and (7) with respect to pu
are
1 =  hm
dm
dpu +

vp
n   vo
n   n(vp
nn   vo
nn)
 dn
dpu   (vo
x + nvo
nx)
dxo
dpu;
0 = (vp
n   vo
n)
dm
dpu +

mvp
nn + (1   m)vo
nn   cn
 dn
dpu + (1   m)vo
nx
dxo
dpu;
0 =  vo
nx
dm
dpu + (1   m)vo
nnx
dn
dpu + (1   m)vo
nxx
dxo
dpu;
which constitute a system of three equations with three unknowns. Solving for
dm=dpu, we obtain
dm
dpu = (1   m) v
o
nxx

(1   m)v
o
nnxv
o
nx   (v
o
nn + m(v
p
nn   v
o
nn)   cn)v
o
nxx

D
 1;
where
D = (1 m)
 
(vp
n   vo
n)vo
nxx + vo
nx vo
nx

 
(vp
n   vo
n   n(vp
nn   vo
nn))vo
nxx + (vo
x + nvo
nx)vo
nnx

+ (hm (1 m)vo
nxx + (vo
x + nvo
nx)vo
nx)
 
(mvp
nn + (1 m)vo
nn   cn)vo
nxx   (1 m)vo
nx vo
nnx

:
Introducing the derivatives in the rst-order conditions for the proprietary plat-
form and solving for pu, pd, and xp, we obtain the results stated in the proposi-
tion.
Endnotes
1 Open access and open investment are complementary but do not always go
hand in hand. For example, MS Explorer is an open-access program, but it does
not allow for open investment as the source code is not made available to users.INVESTMENT INCENTIVES IN TWO-SIDED PLATFORMS 33
2 To the literature on two-sided platforms, an open platform is one that oers
open access, and a proprietary platform is one that has closed access (the platform
sets access prices, positive for at least one side). Thus, this literature is silent about
the investment side of platform openness: an open-source platform not only oers
open access but it also allows users and developers to invest in platform quality
by modifying the source code.
3 For concreteness, we focus on developer investment in open platforms and
assume away user investment. Recent empirical evidence suggests that a large
share of investments in open source are made by rms rather than by users. For
example, a 2012 report by the Linux Foundation (Corbet, Kroah-Hartman, and
McPherson, 2012) states that seventy-ve percent of all Linux kernel development
is done by developers who are being paid for their work, and that the top ten
organizations sponsoring Linux development are Red Hat, Intel, Novell, IBM,
Texas Instruments, Broadcom, Nokia, Samsung, Oracle, and Google. Extending
the model to include user innovation would only strengthen our results.
4 More generally, our model applies to any technology platform allowing the
interaction between sellers and buyers.
5 The assumption of a continuum of users and developers is made for easiness
of exposition. Our results directly translate to a model with a discrete number of
users or developers.
6 Function h may also be interpreted as a taste-dierentiation parameter or
transportation cost.
7 Our model can be thought as an approximation to a more general model
with heterogeneous investment costs and small private benets of investment for
developers. Specically, consider an open platform with substitute applications34 CASADESUS-MASANELL AND LLANES
and suppose the indirect utility for user i is
u(i) = v(n;x) + 
Z n
0
z(x(j))dj  
Z n
0
(j)dj   h(i);
where  z(x(j)) is the standalone contribution to utility of application j, with  
0, zx > 0, and zxx < 0. Finally, suppose that the investment cost of developer j is
(j) and that j > 0. In equilibrium, application prices are vn + z(x(j)), which
means that  z(x(j)) represents the private benet of investment for developer j
(see Llanes and de Elejalde, 2013, for more details). Optimal investments solve
mvnx = (j)    m zx(x(j)). Integrating across developers we obtain that the
equilibrium investment solves
mvnx =
1
n
Z n
o
(j) dj + 
1
n
Z n
o
m zx(x(j)) dj;
which means that mvnx is close to the average of (j) when  is close to zero.
8 This paper focuses on comparing investment incentives for open and propri-
etary two-sided platforms. The model is very general, which allows us to derive
general results on incentives to invest. Unfortunately, however, we cannot make
precise comparisons of welfare and prots without assuming specic functional
forms.
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